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Incentives to invest in higher education are aﬀected by both the direct wage
eﬀect of human capital investments and the indirect wage eﬀect resulting from lower
unemployment risks and shorter spells in unemployment associated with higher
educated. We analyse the returns to education in Austria, Germany, Italy, Sweden
and the United Kingdom, countries which diﬀer signiﬁcantly regarding both their
education systems and labour market structure. We estimate augmented Mincerian
wage equations accounting for the eﬀects of unemployment on individual wages using
EU-SILC data. Across countries we ﬁnd a high variation of the eﬀect of education
on unemployment duration. Overall, the returns to education are estimated to be
the highest in the UK, and the lowest for Sweden. A wage decrease due to time
spent in unemployment results in a decline in the hourly wages in Austria, Germany
and Italy.
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Factors that determine the individual level of education have been of interest to academics
but also to politicians (see e.g. Santiago et al., 2008). Education is considered to be a key
driver for economic growth (Krueger & Lindahl, 2001). This is one reason, why education
became a target in the “EU 2020”, a growth strategy developed by the European com-
mission. Aiming at a “smart, sustainable and inclusive economy” (European Comission,
2010a), improving the quality and eﬃciency of education and training in order to raise
educational levels is one of the long-term objectives (European Comission, 2010b). To
implement and measure the achievement of this objective, the European Commission sets
benchmarks for diﬀerent indicators, e.g. an upper bound on the share of early school
leavers, or a lower bound for the share of 30-34 years old with tertiary educational attain-
ment which should be reached by the year 2020. The EU-member states are thus obliged
to implement strategies to increase the educational attainment in their nation.
Investment in education beyond the minimum school leaving age is a decision every
person has to make. From an economic perspective, the optimal level of education depends
on the returns to education (see e.g. Becker, 1964). Individuals invest in education if
the (life-time) returns exceed the cost. As some countries perform better than others
with respect to the given benchmarks, in this paper, we compare the private returns to
education across selected EU countries to explain cross-country diﬀerences in educational
attainment. When analysing the diﬀerent EU-member states we have to take account of
diﬀerences in their economies. Here it is not only the diﬀerence in the wage structures
that is of importance, but also diﬀerences in unemployment by the level of education.
Lower educational attainment is associated with a higher level of unemployment which in
turn reduces the wage in new employment relative to the previous one. This indirect wage
eﬀect may signiﬁcantly aﬀect the returns to education (for Germany, see Steiner, 2009).
In our analysis we will extend this analysis to several European countries by applying the
methodology proposed by Ashenfelter & Ham (1979) and Nickell (1979). Thus, the eﬀect
of education on wages is split into a direct eﬀect and into an indirect eﬀect accounting
2for the eﬀect of previous unemployment on wages.
Depending on which eﬀect dominates, diﬀerent policy implications arise. To increase
the nations educational attainment if the direct eﬀect of education is the key driver, in-
centives could e.g. be changed by directly aﬀecting the expected returns. Thus, cost of
investment could be lowered by decreasing the time it takes to obtain a certain qualiﬁ-
cation (i.e. making the education process more eﬃcient) or the returns could be directly
aﬀected by varying the tax rate (see e.g. Fossen & Glocker, 2011).
To conduct our analysis, we use the most recent panel wave of the EU Statistics
on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) which provides comparable micro data for
the member states of the European Union. We estimate separate augmented Mincer-
type wage equations for Austria, Germany, Italy, Sweden and UK, countries which diﬀer
signiﬁcantly regarding both their education system and labour market structure. The
returns to education are estimated separately by country and also by gender, due to
the well-known diﬀerences of wages between men and women. Across countries we ﬁnd
following results: First, the direct eﬀect of education on wages is positive and signiﬁcant
for all countries. Second, education has a negative eﬀect on unemployment duration. This
eﬀect is the strongest in Germany, and lowest for Swedish men where it is not statistically
signiﬁcant. As a wage decrease due to time spend in unemployment results in a decline
in the hourly wages in Germany, Austria and Italy, education also has an indirect eﬀect
on wages in these countries.
The paper is structured as follows: First, we provide a short overview over the diﬀerent
institutional characteristics in the diﬀerent countries. Then we conduct our empirical
analysis, describing our estimation strategy in section two, and our data in section three.
In section four, we present our estimation results. Section ﬁve concludes.
32 Institutional diﬀerences across countries
Education is shown to be positively correlated with economic growth (see e.g. Krueger &
Lindahl, 2001). This is one reason why European countries agreed to the action plan of
the European Commission. The EU 2020 strategy sets diﬀerent benchmarks in diﬀerent
ﬁelds related to the countries economies. In the following we focus on the lower bound for
the share of 30-34 years old with tertiary educational attainment, which is set to 40% and
should be reached by the year 2020. While some EU countries already reached this bench-
mark, others face a challenge to obtain this goal. In our analysis, we focus on the following
countries: Austria, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom. We have selected
these countries because both their education systems and labour market structures dif-
fer in interesting ways. While the Austrian and German educational system are broadly
similar and diﬀer signiﬁcantly in terms of enrolment rates in higher education from the
other countries considered here, labour market outcomes in the two countries are quite
distinct. Whereas Austria’s unemployment rate is persistently one of the lowest in the
European Union, Germany has one of the highest rates. Italy also features a relatively low
enrolment rate in tertiary education, but does not have the system of vocational training
prevailing in Austria and Germany which is said to be an important factor contributing
to the relatively low levels of youth unemployment in these two countries. While Sweden
and the United Kingdom both have relatively high enrolment rates in higher education,
its ﬁnancing diﬀers signiﬁcantly between these two countries and they also diﬀer markedly
in terms of labour market outcomes.
The reasons for the diﬀerences in the educational attainment across countries can
arise from various sources: First, entrance qualiﬁcations to universities and the number
of persons obtaining this entrance qualiﬁcation vary across countries. While in Austria
and Germany the share of under 25 year old who graduate from a secondary track that is
designed to prepare for direct entry into tertiary-type A education (ISCED 3A) is rather
low (17 percent and 42 percent respectively), the numbers are much higher in Italy and
Sweden with above 70 percent (see OECD, 2010, p.54). These diﬀerences between the
4countries mainly arise, because Austria and Germany have an attractive vocational track
(ISCED 4). Investments in higher education must pay oﬀ especially in those countries
where attractive outside options are available, i.e. individuals have the choice to work
right away and receive earnings while obtaining a job qualiﬁcation at the same time which
results in higher returns. Prospective students thus will only invest in higher education
if the returns from this education is higher than from the vocational track, taking into
account the direct costs and forgone earnings.
Having a closer look at the institutional diﬀerences, we describe the general educational
organisation of the countries in table 1.
[Table 1 about here]
In all the countries covered in our comparative analysis children have to stay in school
until they have completed at least 9 school years, usually at the age of 15 (Austria),
or are 16 years old (all other countries). In general, by then they have ﬁnished lower
secondary education. All countries have in common that no tuition fees apply up to that
educational level. With the exception of Italy, fees are, if at all, introduced for higher
education only. In Italy, starting with upper secondary education, low fees are charged,
but can be handled very ﬂexibly by schools and can be adjusted with respect to family
income.
A main concern when looking at higher education is that tuition fees may deter
prospective students from taking up tertiary education which would also result in a coun-
tries lower tertiary educational attainment (see, e.g. Steiner & Wrohlich, 2011). The
(tuition) fees for higher education diﬀer substantially across countries. In Sweden, state
funded institutions are not allowed to charge any fees. Thus, they are ﬁnanced through
state grants, and students are educated free of charge. In Germany, tuition fees have
been introduced in some federal states, but they do not exceed an amount of 500 EUR
per semester.
Also in federal states, where no tuition fees have been introduced, students still have
5to pay a small amount for administrative costs (approx. 50 EUR per semester). This is
similar to Italy. Here, a minimum enrolment fee of 175 EUR is mandatory. Universities
themselves can decide about additional tuition fees. In Austria, universities charge an
amount of 363 EUR per semester for national students. In the group of countries under
consideration the United Kingdom is the country with the highest tuition fees. Students
are charged up to 3,500 EUR per year (approx. 1,740 EUR per semester). As Sweden
and the UK are the two countries closest to the benchmark, tuition fees themselves do
not seem to have a clear impact on the incentives to invest in tertiary education. This
could for one be due to the type of student fee scheme in place. While student loans and
scholarships are present in each country, the design and repayment conditions for student
aid schemes vary. In Austria, Germany and UK a means-tested student aid programs are
available. While it is designed as a grant in the UK and in Austria, only half is oﬀered
as a grant in Germany. Half of the amount of student aid received must be repaid with
a cap at 10,000 EUR. Sweden is the only country, where student aid is not means-tested.
Each person who is accepted at a university and is under the age of 54 years, may apply
for student aid. The average amount of the grant is about 78 EUR per week.
Another reason that student fees and average enrolment rates across countries do
not seem to be correlated might be due to diﬀerences in the returns to education across
countries. Next to the direct eﬀect of higher wages with a higher level of education,
indirect eﬀects like the risk of unemployment might be an incentive for an individual to
invest in higher education. Figure 1 plots the unemployment rates by educational level
for each country in 2007.
[Figure 1 about here]
It is evident, that there is a negative correlation between the level of education and the
unemployment probability. The eﬀect varies strongly by country. While a strong negative
relation for Germany, Sweden shows only minor unemployment diﬀerences by the level of
education.
6Bearing the country speciﬁc diﬀerences described in this section in mind, the following
analysis will focus on the returns to education across countries.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Estimation Strategy
We follow the standard human capital approach to the estimation of the returns to ed-
ucation developed by Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974). According this approach an
individual invests into a further year of education if this choice maximises the expected
present value of the future income streams. More education is associated with higher
productivity which results in higher earnings, but also with higher costs due to forgone
earnings and direct costs for education.
As previous studies have shown, education has not only a direct eﬀect on the wage,
but also aﬀect wages through unemployment, see e.g. Ashenfelter & Ham (1979). A lower
level of education is associated with a higher risk of unemployment. Unemployment, i.e.
the cumulated sum of experienced years of unemployment, is assumed to result in a wage
decrease when new employment is found. Neglecting this relationship would result in a
(downward) bias in the returns to education. For Germany, Steiner (2009) has shown that
wage reductions due to cumulated experienced unemployment spells signiﬁcantly aﬀect
the returns to education.
Given there is a suﬃciently large number of future income periods and assuming that
the cost of education can be neglected, the return to education can be explained by the
diﬀerence of the log wages with s years of schooling compared to the log wages with s−1
years. Thus, the returns to education can be estimated by analysing the variation of log
hourly wages with respect to the years of education:
logwi = β1 + β2agei + β3age
2
i + rSi + γuei + vi, (1)
7with wi measuring the earnings of individual i that depends on the years of education
Si, on individuals age and on the cumulated unemployment duration. To capture the
concavity of the earnings proﬁle implied by the standard Mincer-type wage equation we
use the individual’s age in level and squared terms. In the following analysis, the term
unemployment refers to periods when not in employment, such that not only registered
unemployment is captured by this variable, but also periods spent out-of-the-labour-force.
We also have to assume that both an individual’s years of education and unemployment
duration can be treated as exogenous in the wage equation.
The returns to education are then simply the derivative of the log(wage) with respect
to the years of education S:
∂ logw
∂S




If an individual’s level of education is correlated with the duration of unemployment
experienced in the past, neglecting the second term on the right-hand side would yield
a biased estimate of the return to education. To evaluate the eﬀect of education on an
individuals cumulated unemployment duration, we regress the cumulated unemployment
spells experienced in the recent past (see the data description below) on years of education
as well as further control variables like marital status, number of dependent children in
the household and some regional information, i.e. if the individuals lives in a densely
populated area or in the case for Germany if the person lives in the eastern part.1 As there
are many individuals who have not experienced unemployment, we estimate a standard
censored Tobit model (Tobin, 1958). Based on these results, we can calculate for each
individual the cumulated unemployment experience with respect to the individual level
of education.
1In Germany, we prefer to control for East and West Germany rather than the population density of
the area, due to well known structural diﬀerences in the labour market.
83.2 Data
To conduct our analysis, we use the scientiﬁc use-ﬁle of the European Union Statistics on
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), which provides data on a cross-sectional and
on a longitudinal level. The cross-sectional data covers variables on income, poverty, social
exclusion and other living conditions at the time of the survey, whereas the longitudinal
data focuses on individual-level changes over time, observed periodically over, typically,
a four year period. Our analysis refers to the year 2008, the most recent currently avail-
able wave of EU-SILC. Information on the cumulated duration of unemployment is not
directly recorded in our data base but can be derived using panel information on individ-
ual job histories. Since EU-SILC does not provide this information for Germany, we use
information from the national panel, the German Socioeconomic Panel Study (SOEP).
There are a couple of other limitations of EU SILC for our purpose: The ﬁrst refers
to the coding the educational variable into the ISCED-97 scheme2. While the ISCED-97
variable usually records detailed information on the type of school at which the degree
was obtained, the information of an individual’s educational level in the EU-SILC dataset
is aggregated to a high level. Figure 2 compares the detailed ISCED categorisation of
the education variable as reported by the OECD with the more aggregate information
contained in our dataset. While the overall shares of the adult population with a certain
degree in the respective ISCED category is comparable, diﬀerences in the subgroups is
not observable in our data. The high aggregation of the categories is a reason for concerns
for our study, because we are trying to establish an international comparison. Even using
the detailed ISCED-97 categorisation, this comparison induces some problems. While in
a single country analysis this might be true, this assumption is dubious when conduct-
ing a cross-country analysis. For illustration let us assume we have a person living in
country A that has a vocational education scheme which allows for on-the-job training
to obtain a certain job qualiﬁcation. After high-school graduation, a person decides to
do an apprenticeship, such that this persons highest educational level will be ISCED 4.
2See table 14 for the deﬁnitions of the diﬀerent ISCED categories.
9Now let us assume, that this person lives in country B where this on-the-job qualiﬁca-
tion track does not exist. To get the same job qualiﬁcation, this person can only choose
the ISCED 5B-Track. Comparing these two countries simply by these categories, would
indicate a higher educational level for country B. This problem even intensiﬁes when the
categories are aggregated to a higher level, as is in the EU-SILC dataset. It is not possible
to distinguish between diﬀerent subgroups and thus we loose valuable information on the
individuals educational attainment.
[Figure 2 about here]
To facilitate the cross country comparison, we use the years of education associated
with the respective categories instead of using the ISCED categories. Conditional on each
country, we thus assign the average years of education to obtain a certain degree based
on the information in table 1.
The second aspect we have to deal with concerns the information on an individual’s
cumulated duration of unemployment, which is not directly recorded in our dataset. We
therefore use the panel structure of EU-SILC to construct a proxy for this variable. Since
the panel is available since 2005, we can only calculate this variable over the past four
years. However, since past unemployment is likely to have the strongest impact on in-
dividual wages if experienced recently, this measure should work quite well. With the
exception of the United Kingdom, we also have the retrospective information on “number
of years in paid employment”. Deducting the sum of this variable and years of education
plus the average year at school enrolment from an individual’s age we construct a mea-
sure of “cumulated years not spent in paid employment” which we include as a robustness
check in an alternative speciﬁcation of the wage equation.
Another issue concerns the measurement of the earnings variable. For all of the coun-
tries the variable “employee cash or near cash income” is available which reﬂects gross
income per year. However, between the countries the collected information slightly varies
(see table 2). Additional information on net income was collected for all countries except
10the United Kingdom. Here, we use the information on gross income to calculate the re-
spective net income by applying the tax-schedule (see table 15 for the marginal rates).
We conduct our estimation both for gross and net income. Comparing the results pro-
vides insights how countries’ returns diﬀer due to their tax schedule. Since we also have
information on hours usually worked during a week, we construct a variable reﬂecting the
earnings per hour which we use as dependent variable.
[Table 2 about here]
4 Estimation Results
We conduct our estimation of the returns to education in two diﬀerent steps. First, we
estimate the eﬀect of education on the cumulated duration of previous unemployment.
In the second step, we estimate the returns to education, taking into account the eﬀect
of cumulated unemployment, measured by the cumulated months not worked during the
last four years, on individual wages. Furthermore, we conduct a robustness check by
using the time not spent in paid employment as an alternative measure of unemployment
experience.
4.1 Eﬀect of education on previous unemployment
We ﬁrst report the eﬀect of education on the experienced unemployment duration in table
3 and 4 in the appendix. The results show, that another year of education is associated
with a reduction in the cumulated unemployment duration. This eﬀect is signiﬁcant for
all countries and genders, with the exception for Swedish men for whom the estimated
coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding might result from a low level as well
as a low variance of cumulated unemployment in the Swedish sample (see table 11). As
the coeﬃcients in a tobit model do not directly translate into marginal eﬀects, table 5 and
6 in the appendix report the estimated changes in the probability to have experienced
11at least one month of unemployment during the last four years, as well as the expected
(unconditional) duration of the cumulated unemployment spell with respect to years of
education. The values are calculated with the covariates set to the European average
for men and women respectively which can be found in table 13.3 The probability to
experience a positive spell of unemployment reduces by up to 23 percentages point, when
comparing someone with 16 years of education (university level) to someone with only nine
years of education (basic education) ceteris paribus. The highest decrease is observable
for German and Austrian men, and the lowest for Swedish men and women.
Not only the incident rate decrease with higher education, but also the unconditional
expected length of the cumulated unemployment. For German men the decrease in the ex-
pected unemployment duration is the highest with six months, and the lowest for Swedish
women.4
4.2 Returns to education
The results from this ﬁrst step conﬁrm that the level of education aﬀects the expected
cumulated unemployment duration. The extend on how the level of education and the
expected cumulated unemployment duration aﬀect hourly wages is reported in table 7.
An additional year of schooling exerts both a direct eﬀect on hourly wages and an indirect
eﬀect through the cumulated duration of unemployment. In addition to these two eﬀects,
in the following table we also report their combined eﬀect calculated with the covariates
set to the European average.
[Table 7 about here]
The returns to education are positive and signiﬁcant for men. Comparing the gross returns
to education across countries, the UK has on average the highest returns to education
3Since the mean is set to the European average, the reported incidences and unemployment durations
are not representative for the chosen country, they rather pick up the eﬀects for an “artiﬁcially created”
person who we use to compare the diﬀerent countries. For country speciﬁc means see table 13 and table
12.
4The eﬀects are even smaller for Swedish men where the coeﬃcient was estimated not to be signiﬁcant.
12with an increase in the hourly wages by 9 percent with an additional year of education.
Sweden has the lowest gross returns to education with 4 percent. The eﬀect of the
expected cumulated unemployment duration is negative, but not statistically signiﬁcant
for Sweden and the UK. Although the level of schooling has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
cumulated unemployment duration in the UK, the expected cumulated unemployment
duration itself has not a signiﬁcant eﬀect on wages. The indirect eﬀect of education
on wages through the channel of the cumulated unemployment duration is the highest
for Germany. Here, disregarding the eﬀects would severely underestimate the returns to
education.
Focussing on the net returns, the ordering across countries found for gross returns
remains. A slight change occurs when comparing Austria and Germany. While Austria
has slightly higher gross returns (7.2 percent compared to 7 percent), Germany has with
6 percent 0.2 percentage points higher net returns. Looking how the returns to education
change when comparing gross and net hourly wages, the UK has, on average, the highest
reduction, i.e. by roughly 2 percentage points. In Austria, Italy and Germany, the
respective net returns are approx. one percentage point lower than the gross returns.
Sweden shows the smallest change with 0.7 percentage points. Interpreting this diﬀerence
between gross and net returns as the “social return to education”, the UK beneﬁts the
most from a high level of education in the population.
For women we estimate signiﬁcant positive returns to education as well. As for men,
the cumulated unemployment duration is signiﬁcant for Austria, Germany and Italy. The
combined gross as well as the net returns to education is highest for UK and Austrian
women with 9 percent (and 7 percent when considering the net returns). As for men,
Swedish women are estimated to have the lowest returns with respect to education.
Comparing the returns of education by gender across countries, we ﬁnd that there are
no signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences in the UK. While the returns are slightly lower for women
in Germany and Sweden than for their male, the opposite is true for Austria and Italy.
13We ﬁnd similar results in our robustness checks where we use the cumulated time not
worked during the lifetime. The results are reported in tables 8 to 10 in the appendix.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we compare the returns to education across ﬁve European countries (Austria,
Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) which diﬀer signiﬁcantly with respect
to both education systems and labour market structures. We apply an augmented Mince-
rian wage equation, splitting the eﬀect of education into a direct eﬀect and into an indirect
eﬀect by accounting for the cumulated duration of previous unemployment. Across coun-
tries we ﬁnd a high variation not only in the returns to education, but also of the eﬀect
of education on unemployment duration. While there is a strong eﬀect for Germany,
the eﬀect is not signiﬁcant for Swedish men. Previous unemployment reduces wages in
Austria, Germany and Italy.
Our ﬁndings for the direct eﬀect of education on wages are comparable to those found
in previous studies. While the UK exhibits the highest returns to education, Sweden has
only very low returns to education. This ﬁnding is puzzling with respect to the share
of university graduates in the respective countries. If the returns would be the only
determinant in the decision to pursue higher education, Sweden would not be expected
to have such a high share of university graduates. However, other factors also aﬀect
enrolment in higher education. For one, Sweden as well as the UK have a higher share of
individuals who are eligible to enter tertiary education. As for the individuals who faced
the decision to invest into another year of education, entrance barriers in form of tuition
fees may have an impact. While the costs of education in the analysed countries are
relatively small when compared to the lifetime income, they might still have an impact at
the time the decision is made. The diﬀerent countries seem to react with diﬀerent policies
in order to maintain high graduation rates.
While the UK has high returns to education, tuition fees are also more common
14than in the other countries considered here, whereas Sweden with rather low returns
follows a diﬀerent strategy with a very generous student aid scheme. With respect to
the benchmarks set in the EU 2020 strategy, both policies seem to work. However, it
seems premature to draw policy conclusions from these observations for countries with
quite diﬀerent educational and vocational systems in place. For example, for part of
youth with a qualifying secondary education the vocational training systems of Austria
and Germany might be more attractive than enrolment into university. If apprenticeship
systems providing high-quality vocational training exist, as it used to be the case in
Austria and Germany, there is less need to reach the politically set benchmark of tertiary
educational attainment.
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20B Tables
Table 1: Institutional characteristics in the diﬀerent countries
Austria Germany Italy Sweden United Kingdom
Compulsory school age 6–15 6–16 6–16 7–16 5–16
Average age when ﬁnished:
pre-school: ISCED 0 6 6–7 6 7 5
primary: ISCED 1 10 10 11 13 11
lower secondary: ISCED 2 14 16 14 16 14
upper secondary: ISECD 3 18–19 18–19 19 19 17–18
post secondary, non tertiary: ISCED 4 19–20 21–22 21 21 (∗)
tertiary: ISCED 5 21–24 22–25 22–25 21–24 20–23
ISCED 5
Tuition Fees in EUR/semester: 363 ≤ 500 ≥ 175 - ≤ ∼ 291
Student Aid :
Means-tested: yes yes - no yes
Max. amount (in EUR/month): 679 670 312 285
Repayment: non-repayable max. non-repayable
when successfully 10,000 EUR
ﬁnished
In no country tuition fees apply during compulsory education (if not private school)
∗ Access Courses (Further/higher education) usually at age 18–19
Source: European Comission (2010c,d,e,f,g)
Table 2: Deﬁnition of gross and net income in the EU-SILC Dataset
Austria gross income net income
Germany1 gross income net income
Italy net of tax on income at source and
social contributions
net income
Sweden net of tax on social contributions net income
United Kingdom gross -
1 Information from the GSOEP
21Table 3: Tobit - Men
Austria Germany Italy Sweden UK
Yrs. of educ. −2.338∗∗ −3.041∗∗ −1.615∗∗ 0.002 −2.055∗∗
(0.387) (0.268) (0.153) (0.292) (0.395)
kids 4.959∗∗ 2.622 −0.642 0.975 −4.439∗
(1.761) (1.786) (1.410) (1.757) (2.226)
city1 3.878∗ −1.465 −0.276 2.644
(1.591) (1.157) (1.851) (2.258)
married −6.413∗∗ −13.270∗∗ −13.522∗∗ −5.244∗∗ −2.869
(1.884) (1.798) (1.426) (1.639) (2.099)
age −0.684 −3.102∗∗ −2.395∗∗ 0.175 −0.173
(0.769) (0.610) (0.555) (0.668) (0.773)
age squared 0.009 0.037∗∗ 0.025∗∗ −0.003 0.000
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
east 18.096∗∗
(1.482)
cons 21.914 88.402∗∗ 56.732∗∗ −17.725 3.322
(16.589) (12.916) (11.353) (14.535) (17.303)
sigma
cons 20.400∗∗ 30.241∗∗ 28.738∗∗ 16.180∗∗ 23.496∗∗
(1.142) (0.758) (0.616) (1.144) (1.456)
N 1622 3587 5512 1168 2018
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Signiﬁcance-level: ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Table 4: Tobit - Women
Austria Germany Italy Sweden UK
Yrs. of educ. −1.066∗∗ −2.205∗∗ −1.648∗∗ −0.963∗∗ −1.172∗∗
(0.308) (0.258) (0.130) (0.326) (0.260)
kids 16.711∗∗ 8.696∗∗ 5.409∗∗ 1.798 10.187∗∗
(1.712) (1.645) (1.044) (2.152) (1.451)
city1 0.627 −3.771∗∗ −0.897 −0.148
(1.579) (0.974) (2.357) (1.519)
married 1.937 −14.472∗∗ −0.588 −3.796∗ −1.588
(1.596) (1.553) (1.049) (1.875) (1.361)
age −3.595∗∗ −2.548∗∗ −1.731∗∗ −2.360∗∗ −0.449
(0.821) (0.607) (0.495) (0.815) (0.558)
age squared 0.036∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.011 0.021∗ 0.002
(0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006)
east 17.983∗∗
(1.532)
cons 75.685∗∗ 60.022∗∗ 59.298∗∗ 52.477∗∗ 7.831
(16.090) (12.725) (9.890) (17.350) (12.056)
sigma
cons 21.704∗∗ 30.931∗∗ 24.821∗∗ 19.950∗∗ 21.139∗∗
(0.783) (0.726) (0.467) (1.391) (0.909)
N 1445 3751 4642 1232 2276
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Signiﬁcance-level: ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
22Table 5: Changes in unemployment duration with varying education - Men
Austria Germany Italy Sweden UK
EU-Mean
Probability 0.151∗∗ 0.257∗∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.116∗∗ 0.083∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.016) (0.011)
Duration 1.595∗∗ 4.670∗∗ 1.973∗∗ 0.918∗∗ 0.885∗∗
(0.176) (0.320) (0.125) (0.163) (0.146)
With 9 years of education
Probability 0.283∗∗ 0.401∗∗ 0.191∗∗ 0.116∗∗ 0.150∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.008) (0.023) (0.019)
Duration 3.595∗∗ 8.661∗∗ 3.026∗∗ 0.917∗∗ 1.826∗∗
(0.473) (0.817) (0.165) (0.230) (0.317)
With 10 years of education
Probability 0.246∗∗ 0.363∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.116∗∗ 0.131∗∗
(0.021) (0.023) (0.008) (0.021) (0.016)
Duration 2.977∗∗ 7.499∗∗ 2.729∗∗ 0.917∗∗ 1.538∗∗
(0.348) (0.658) (0.148) (0.207) (0.252)
With 12 years of education
Probability 0.180∗∗ 0.291∗∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.116∗∗ 0.097∗∗
(0.014) (0.016) (0.007) (0.017) (0.012)
Duration 1.986∗∗ 5.515∗∗ 2.206∗∗ 0.918∗∗ 1.073∗∗
(0.204) (0.410) (0.129) (0.172) (0.170)
With 16 years of education
Probability 0.085∗∗ 0.170∗∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.116∗∗ 0.050∗∗
(0.013) (0.009) (0.007) (0.017) (0.010)
Duration 0.790∗∗ 2.750∗∗ 1.402∗∗ 0.919∗∗ 0.487∗∗
(0.152) (0.180) (0.122) (0.175) (0.110)
Table 6: Changes in unemployment duration with varying education - Women
Austria Germany Italy Sweden UK
EU-Mean
Probability 0.206∗∗ 0.238∗∗ 0.245∗∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.160∗∗
(0.015) (0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.013)
Duration 2.515∗∗ 4.330∗∗ 3.596∗∗ 0.975∗∗ 1.787∗∗
(0.238) (0.273) (0.180) (0.169) (0.188)
With 9 years of education
Probability 0.274∗∗ 0.348∗∗ 0.347∗∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.229∗∗
(0.025) (0.024) (0.012) (0.025) (0.020)
Duration 3.665∗∗ 7.229∗∗ 5.786∗∗ 1.514∗∗ 2.809∗∗
(0.449) (0.683) (0.270) (0.322) (0.338)
With 10 years of education
Probability 0.258∗∗ 0.322∗∗ 0.323∗∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.212∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.011) (0.021) (0.017)
Duration 3.381∗∗ 6.491∗∗ 5.233∗∗ 1.378∗∗ 2.551∗∗
(0.370) (0.563) (0.236) (0.272) (0.283)
With 12 years of education
Probability 0.228∗∗ 0.273∗∗ 0.277∗∗ 0.116∗∗ 0.182∗∗
(0.016) (0.015) (0.009) (0.016) (0.014)
Duration 2.864∗∗ 5.180∗∗ 4.245∗∗ 1.135∗∗ 2.089∗∗
(0.265) (0.372) (0.193) (0.199) (0.211)
With 16 years of education
Probability 0.173∗∗ 0.187∗∗ 0.196∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.129∗∗
(0.017) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014)
Duration 2.013∗∗ 3.167∗∗ 2.695∗∗ 0.754∗∗ 1.366∗∗
(0.258) (0.194) (0.175) (0.151) (0.185)
23Table 7: Returns to education
Austria Germany Italy Sweden UK
Men
Gross Returns
Yrs. of educ. 0.065∗∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.094∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Cum. unempl. −0.019∗∗ −0.027∗∗ −0.019∗∗ −0.013 −0.001
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008)
age 0.029∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.016 0.073∗∗
(0.014) (0.008) (0.006) (0.012) (0.010)
age squared −0.000 −0.001∗∗ −0.000∗∗ −0.000 −0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cons 1.225∗∗ 0.652∗∗ 0.794∗∗ 2.024∗∗ 0.161
(0.309) (0.196) (0.130) (0.259) (0.212)
N 1526 3118 4877 1088 1985
Combined eﬀect 0.072 0.070 0.055 0.044 0.094
Net returns
Yrs. of educ. 0.053∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.073∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Cum. unempl. −0.013∗∗ −0.024∗∗ −0.014∗∗ −0.008 0.006
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.008)
age 0.020 0.056∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.008 0.049∗∗
(0.013) (0.008) (0.005) (0.011) (0.008)
age squared −0.000 −0.001∗∗ −0.000∗∗ −0.000 −0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cons 1.198∗∗ 0.365∗ 0.678∗∗ 2.019∗∗ 0.610∗∗
(0.282) (0.182) (0.116) (0.235) (0.183)
N 1526 3118 4877 1088 1985
Combined eﬀect 0.058 0.060 0.044 0.037 0.072
Women
Gross Returns
Yrs. of educ. 0.087∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.092∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004)
Cum. unempl. −0.009∗∗ −0.019∗∗ −0.011∗∗ 0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.004)
age 0.033∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.010 0.092∗∗ 0.036∗∗
(0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.010)
age squared −0.000 −0.000∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗ −0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cons 0.693∗ 0.938∗∗ 1.213∗∗ 0.416 0.826∗∗
(0.301) (0.184) (0.165) (0.441) (0.217)
N 1305 2784 3891 1158 2217
Combined eﬀect 0.089 0.063 0.070 0.029 0.091
Net returns
Yrs. of educ. 0.072∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.057∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.071∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004)
Cum. unempl. −0.006∗∗ −0.014∗∗ −0.008∗∗ 0.004 0.009∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.004)
age 0.032∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.013 0.088∗∗ 0.028∗∗
(0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.017) (0.009)
age squared −0.000 −0.000∗∗ −0.000 −0.001∗∗ −0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cons 0.604∗ 0.951∗∗ 1.052∗∗ 0.306 0.992∗∗
(0.271) (0.167) (0.154) (0.435) (0.196)
N 1305 2784 3891 1158 2217
Combined eﬀect 0.074 0.050 0.060 0.024 0.070
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Signiﬁcance-level: ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
24Table 8: Tobit Men - Robustness-Checks
Austria Germany Italy Sweden
Yrs. of educ. −0.550∗∗ −0.784∗∗ −0.353∗∗ 0.309∗∗
(0.097) (0.034) (0.025) (0.041)
kids −0.051 0.567∗∗ 0.268 −0.047
(0.537) (0.215) (0.220) (0.269)
city1 1.177∗ −0.239 −0.099
(0.471) (0.184) (0.282)
married −0.913 −1.862∗∗ −0.920∗∗ −0.282
(0.546) (0.221) (0.233) (0.244)
age 0.249 −0.065 −0.151 0.427∗∗
(0.233) (0.081) (0.090) (0.104)
age squared −0.002 0.001 0.003∗ −0.005∗∗
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
east 0.471∗
(0.199)
cons −4.949 15.921∗∗ 7.979∗∗ −12.464∗∗
(5.033) (1.774) (1.870) (2.257)
sigma
cons 6.868∗∗ 4.892∗∗ 6.090∗∗ 3.619∗∗
(0.270) (0.074) (0.080) (0.100)
N 1618 3587 5416 1145
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Signiﬁcance-level: ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
25Table 9: Tobit Women - Robustness-Checks
Austria Germany Italy Sweden
Yrs. of educ. −0.614∗∗ −1.278∗∗ −0.558∗∗ −0.094
(0.088) (0.044) (0.030) (0.052)
kids 2.786∗∗ 3.367∗∗ 0.388 0.292
(0.500) (0.265) (0.239) (0.374)
city1 −0.895∗ −0.439∗ 0.386
(0.453) (0.212) (0.376)
married 1.789∗∗ 0.883∗∗ −0.052 −0.009
(0.451) (0.252) (0.231) (0.307)
age −0.097 0.237∗ 0.353∗∗ 0.006
(0.246) (0.105) (0.108) (0.130)
age suqared 0.005 0.001 −0.003∗ 0.001
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
east −2.402∗∗
(0.254)
cons 2.831 13.006∗∗ −0.372 0.661
(5.215) (2.294) (2.219) (2.894)
sigma
cons 7.391∗∗ 6.615∗∗ 6.428∗∗ 4.934∗∗
(0.193) (0.085) (0.089) (0.126)
N 1440 3751 4517 1211
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Signiﬁcance-level: ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
26Table 10: Returns to education - Robustness-Checks
Austria Germany Italy Sweden
Men
Gross Returns
Yrs. of educ. 0.065∗∗ 0.062∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.048∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
Cum. unempl. −0.039∗∗ 0.009∗∗ −0.012∗∗ −0.016∗
(0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008)
age 0.030∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.022
(0.014) (0.008) (0.006) (0.013)
age squared −0.000 −0.001∗∗ −0.000∗∗ −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cons 1.177∗∗ 0.157 0.771∗∗ 1.865∗∗
(0.306) (0.195) (0.131) (0.270)
N 1526 3118 4877 1069
Combined eﬀect 0.071 0.056 0.053 0.045
Net returns
Yrs. of educ. 0.053∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.039∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
Cum. unempl. −0.029∗∗ 0.008∗∗ −0.009∗∗ −0.013∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007)
age 0.022 0.064∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.012
(0.013) (0.008) (0.005) (0.012)
age squared −0.000 −0.001∗∗ −0.000∗∗ −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cons 1.163∗∗ −0.068 0.661∗∗ 1.900∗∗
(0.280) (0.181) (0.117) (0.244)
N 1526 3118 4877 1069
Combined eﬀect 0.058 0.047 0.043 0.037
Women
Gross Returns
Yrs. of educ. 0.082∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.028∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.008)
Cum. unempl. −0.017∗∗ −0.010∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.013∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
age 0.033∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.015 0.096∗∗
(0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018)
age squared −0.000 −0.000∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cons 0.680∗ 0.946∗∗ 1.111∗∗ 0.348
(0.308) (0.189) (0.166) (0.446)
N 1305 2784 3891 1141
Combined 0.088 0.056 0.068 0.029
Net returns
Yrs. of educ. 0.069∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.055∗∗ 0.024∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007)
Cum. unempl. −0.011∗∗ −0.008∗∗ −0.010∗∗ −0.012
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006)
age 0.032∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.016∗ 0.092∗∗
(0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.018)
age squared −0.000 −0.000∗∗ −0.000 −0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cons 0.602∗ 0.959∗∗ 0.982∗∗ 0.245
(0.276) (0.170) (0.156) (0.440)
N 1305 2784 3891 1141
Combined 0.073 0.044 0.059 0.025
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Signiﬁcance-level: ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
27Table 11: Descriptive statistics by country (Men)
Austria Germany Italy Sweden UK
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Whole Sample:
Employed 0.950 0.218 0.949 0.219 0.906 0.292 0.960 0.197 0.963 0.190
Yrs. educ. 13.048 2.368 15.766 2.419 11.281 3.581 13.388 2.945 12.637 2.636
Age 42.589 8.843 44.967 9.737 42.065 9.348 43.111 10.511 45.092 10.280
Number of children 0.453 0.498 0.363 0.481 0.391 0.488 0.451 0.498 0.413 0.492
Living in a densely pop. Area 0.314 0.464 . . 0.362 0.481 0.213 0.410 0.768 0.422
Married 0.672 0.470 0.700 0.458 0.648 0.478 0.519 0.500 0.676 0.468
Cumulated experienced unemployment spells over
last 4 years (in month) 1.832 5.967 4.306 11.014 3.399 8.898 1.028 3.719 1.130 4.844
lifetime (in yrs) 1.006 2.743 2.707 4.517 3.565 4.391 1.935 2.725 . .
Working sample:
log(hourly wage) gross 2.872 0.503 2.807 0.518 2.577 0.475 3.075 0.485 3.013 0.567
log(hourly wage) net 2.494 0.444 2.376 0.480 2.289 0.412 2.762 0.432 2.666 0.474
Yrs. educ. 13.111 2.350 15.891 2.249 11.381 3.510 13.434 2.938 12.699 2.634
Age 42.370 8.763 44.499 9.416 42.363 9.206 42.907 10.538 45.094 10.228
Number of children 0.459 0.499 0.380 0.486 0.404 0.491 0.453 0.498 0.419 0.493
Living in a densely pop. Area 0.307 0.462 . . 0.361 0.480 0.217 0.412 0.770 0.421
Married 0.681 0.466 0.717 0.451 0.675 0.468 0.527 0.500 0.682 0.466
Cumulated experienced unemployment spells over
last 4 years (in month) 0.895 3.352 1.541 5.328 1.165 4.330 0.513 2.233 0.438 2.426
lifetime (in yrs) 0.760 2.119 2.087 3.833 3.253 4.005 1.836 2.583 . .
2
8Table 12: Descriptive statistics by country (Women)
Austria Germany Italy Sweden UK
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Whole Sample:
Employed 0.934 0.249 0.938 0.241 0.871 0.336 0.963 0.190 0.977 0.149
Yrs. educ. 12.824 2.476 15.576 2.530 12.328 3.463 13.961 2.905 12.738 2.657
Age 42.425 8.352 44.293 9.560 41.152 8.995 44.368 10.633 44.446 9.938
Number of children 0.409 0.492 0.366 0.482 0.406 0.491 0.438 0.496 0.421 0.494
Living in a densely pop. Area 0.342 0.474 . . 0.361 0.480 0.197 0.398 0.756 0.430
Married 0.597 0.491 0.676 0.468 0.624 0.484 0.526 0.500 0.623 0.485
Cumulated experienced unemployment spells over
last 4 years (in month) 4.318 9.128 4.508 11.214 5.653 10.909 1.433 4.998 2.205 6.423
lifetime (in yrs) 3.892 5.415 8.059 7.779 4.203 5.035 2.871 3.881 . .
Working sample:
log(hourly wage) gross 2.641 0.512 2.565 0.475 2.510 0.517 2.952 0.698 2.771 0.577
log(hourly wage) net 2.334 0.453 2.106 0.420 2.251 0.468 2.684 0.681 2.515 0.511
Yrs. educ. 12.893 2.414 15.833 2.286 12.479 3.397 14.047 2.869 12.779 2.651
Age 42.708 8.242 44.239 9.301 41.819 8.944 44.453 10.588 44.323 9.839
Number of children 0.395 0.489 0.316 0.465 0.395 0.489 0.442 0.497 0.420 0.494
Living in a densely pop. Area 0.333 0.472 . . 0.370 0.483 0.193 0.394 0.755 0.430
Married 0.601 0.490 0.659 0.474 0.637 0.481 0.534 0.499 0.627 0.484
Cumulated experienced unemployment spells over
last 4 years (in month) 3.041 7.569 1.570 5.679 2.458 6.211 0.905 3.503 1.535 4.877
lifetime (in yrs) 3.697 5.344 6.632 7.017 3.827 4.648 2.805 3.842 . .
2
9Table 13: Descriptives by country
Men Women
mean sd mean sd
Whole Sample:
Employed 0.935 0.246 0.923 0.266
Yrs. educ. 13.016 3.483 13.511 3.234
Age 43.410 9.731 43.039 9.535
Number of children 0.400 0.490 0.401 0.490
Living in a densely pop. Area 0.417 0.493 0.431 0.495
Married 0.657 0.475 0.627 0.484
Cumulated experienced unemployment spells over
last 4 years (in month) 2.913 8.522 4.198 9.847
lifetime (in yrs) 2.793 4.200 5.339 6.390
Working sample:
log(hourly wage) gross 2.781 0.537 2.635 0.558
log(hourly wage) net 2.436 0.475 2.321 0.523
Yrs. educ. 13.092 3.411 13.567 3.158
Age 43.370 9.563 43.272 9.385
Number of children 0.411 0.492 0.385 0.487
Living in a densely pop. Area 0.419 0.493 0.438 0.496
Married 0.675 0.469 0.626 0.484
Cumulated experienced unemployment spells over
last 4 years (in month) 1.054 4.142 1.969 5.831
lifetime (in yrs) 2.407 3.717 4.537 5.675
30Table 14: ISCED 97-Categories
ISCED 0 Pre-primary education
ISCED 1 Primary education or ﬁrst stage of basic education
ISCED 2 Lower secondary or second stage of basic education
ISCED 2A: programmes designed for direct access to level 3 in a sequence which
would ultimately lead to tertiary education, i.e. entrance to ISCED 3A
or 3B
ISCED 2B: programmes designed for direct access to level 3C
ISCED 2C: programmes primarily designed for direct access to the labour market at
the end of this level (sometimes referred to as ’terminal’ programmes)
ISCED 3 (Upper) secondary education
ISCED 3A: programmes at level 3, designed to provide direct access to ISCED 5A
ISCED 3B: programmes at level 3 designed to provide direct access to ISCED 5B
ISCED 3C: programmes at level 3 not designed to lead directly to ISCED 5A or 5B
ISCED 4 Post-secondary non-tertiary education
ISCED 4A: programmes that prepare for entry to ISCED 5
ISCED 4B: programmes not giving access to level 5 (primarily designed for direct
labour market entry)
ISCED 5 First stage of tertiary education
ISCED 5A: tertiary programmes that are largely theoretically based and are in-
tended to provide suﬃcient qualiﬁcations for gaining entry into ad-
vanced research programmes and profession with high skills require-
ments
ISCED 5B: tertiary programmes that are practically oriented/occupationally spe-
ciﬁc and is mainly designed for participants to acquire the practical
skills, and know-how needed for employment in a particular occupation
or trade or class of occupations or trades - the successful completion of
which usually provides the participants with a labour-market relevant
qualiﬁcation
ISCED 6 Second stage of tertiary education (leading to an advanced research
qualiﬁcation)
Source: UNESCO (2006)
Table 15: UK Tax Schedule 2008
Marginal tax rate Income threshold
0 <6035 GBP
20 6035 − 34800 GBP
40 >34800 GBP
Source: OECD (2008), p. 437
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